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I.  Introduction  
 Much of economic theory is driven by the belief that individuals make rational decisions 
based on maximizing their individual utility.1  Nothing in conventional economics strictly 
requires defining self-interest so “myopically” that other regarding preferences are ignored. 
Nevertheless, that is how most traditional economics has viewed rational choice.  This largely 
egoistic or selfish view of rationality applies even more strongly to much of law and economics, 
a discipline which Robert Frank has described as “Posnerian,” and “skeptical of non-material 
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1 Robert B. Thompson, Teaching Business Associations: Norms, Economics and Cognitive Learning, 34 GEORGIA L. 
REV. 997, 1000 (2000) (explaining that “economics ...assumes choices based on maximizing individual utility.”) 
 
motives.”2  In fact, Posner has rejected “woolly legal notions like ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ as 
‘terms which have no content.’”3 
 Most legal scholars have come to (or always did) recognize the limitations of traditional 
law and economics, because of its obtuseness in failing to recognize that most individuals in fact 
do not act as if they were solely self-interested. 4  More and more legal scholars are thus using 
behavioral psychology to obtain a richer understanding of individuals’ economic and legal 
behavior.  “Behavioral economics,” or “behavioral law and economics (BLE),” offers new and 
intriguing tools for legal scholars.  While adopting some of the conventional premises of law and 
economics, such as the belief that legal rules affect behavior, BLE distances itself from many of 
the traditional assumptions of law and economics, such as a dependence on individual economic 
“rationality” as the sole determinant of behavior.  BLE does this in part by using insights from 
psychology, which provide an account of human behavior that is more sophisticated than 
typically used in economics.  BLE scholars have given scholarly weight to the common sense 
insight that individuals make decisions and act in the world on many different bases, only some 
of which can be described as economic.  Utility maximization is only one rationale for action; 
certain behaviors are much more readily explained by psychological and behavioral phenomena 
that have little to do with personal utility maximization.   
 In particular, behavioral scholars have done much to advance the understanding of other-
regarding preferences (“ORPs”), the notion that individuals act in part based on preferences that 
take into account the interests, desires, preferences, and needs of others.  As BLE scholars have 
become more sophisticated, it has become easier – and more pressing – to examine the 
implications for law of consistent and patterned deviations from rational choice predictions.  
ORPs constitute an important group of these deviations.5 
                                                 
2 ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1998) at 163. 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 As one scholar has aptly observed, “People behave rationally.  Except, apparently, when they don’t.”  Owen D. 
Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 
95 N.W. U. L. REV. 1141,1141 (2001). 
 
5 Id. at 1142. 
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 One of the remaining bastions of traditional law and economics is corporate law 
scholarship,6 in which the corporation is viewed as a nexus of express and implied contracts 
entered into by rational, utility maximizing constituencies.  Though this model continues to 
dominate the pedagogy and scholarship of corporate law in the United States, it largely ignores 
the possibility that actors within the corporation are affected by complex norms of behavior that 
take into account ORPs and other non-utilitarian motivations. 
 This failure of the traditional, law and economics view of corporate law has both 
descriptive and normative implications.7  For example, as a descriptive matter, an 
acknowledgement of the possibility of ORPs among corporate managers could help explain why 
the black-letter requirement of profit maximization is mitigated by the business judgment rule 
and, in most states, stakeholder statutes.  Both give managers more ability to act on the basis of 
ORPs to take into account the interests of non-shareholder constituencies than a strict profit rule 
would allow.  Indeed, the presence of ORPs among managers could help explain why the profit 
rule exists in the first place.  Absent the rule, shareholders might worry that the managers’ ORPs 
for shareholders might be outweighed by their ORPs for other constituencies.  More generally, 
an understanding of the presence of any systematic “irrational” motivation such as a taste for 
fairness could help in developing a counter-narrative to that of corporations composed of 
constituencies that optimally determine their mutual rights and obligations by contract.8  An 
important part of developing this alternative story is to examine how the interaction of ORPs and 
current norms of corporate behavior affect corporations.9  
                                                 
6 See JENNIFER ARLEN ET AL., ENDOWMENT EFFECTS WITHIN CORPORATE AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS (USC CLEO, 
Research Paper No. C01-1,  2001, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=276110 at 1 
(noting that behavioral economics raises “fundamental doubts” about traditional law-and-economics approach to 
business law).   See also Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens and Aristotle to 
Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 799 (1998) (arguing that corporate 
law is the “closest living relative” of classic utilitarianism). 
 
7 See Lynn A. Stout,  In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and 
the Business Judgment Rule, 96 N.W. L. Rev. 675 (2002) (discussing ORPs as a partial basis for directors taking 
due care notwithstanding the low probability of liability for acting without due care). 
 
8 Thompson, supra n.__, at 1003. See also Larry Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, 24 J. of Corp. L. 869 (1999).  
 
9 Arlen, et al. supra, n. 6, at 2. 
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 Normatively, an acknowledgement of the presence and power of ORPs among corporate 
managers could provide an argument for a permissive rule of corporate management (such as 
that exemplified by the business judgment rule and stakeholder statutes), if one believes that 
ORPs are to be encouraged.  On the other hand, one could use the presence of ORPs to argue that 
managers should be held to a strict norm of profit maximization in order to guard against the 
managers’ urges to use corporate assets to benefit non-shareholder constituencies. 
 Much could turn, therefore, on a more sophisticated understanding of the role played by 
ORPs within corporations and corporate law.  In this study, we begin to explore the strength of 
one particular ORP, which we call “fairness.”  In this context, what we mean by “fairness” is 
simply a belief that people should share a given set of assets.  Of course, all people do not 
believe they should share, and even the most generous person may not share at all times.  But 
studies do indeed show that most people hold robust and fairly consistent beliefs about the 
importance of sharing in given contexts.10   What we do in this study is to test these norms in a 
principal-agent context, which can be analogized to that of a firm. 
 We focus on an analysis of ORPs in a principal-agent context because directors are 
generally considered  agents for the corporation.11  How can we understand the behavior of 
directors?  They are bound by largely aspirational fiduciary duties,12 and they are driven by a 
norm requiring them to act to maximize shareholder wealth.13  Some eminent scholars even argue 
that this norm has become so powerful and pervasive that it represents the “end of corporate law” 
as a field containing competing paradigms.14  Yet little is known about the interaction of ORPs  
with the legal and market-driven norms that otherwise affect the decisions of corporate directors.  
To date, little work has been done on exploring ORPs in the principal-agent context.15  We 
                                                 
 
10 See studies cited infra at n. __. 
 
11 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § -- at – (1986). 
 
12 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999).  
 
13 Id. at ___.   
 
14 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001). 
 
15 The most relevant study to date is that of Jennifer Arlen, et al., supra n. 7.  Their study indicates that the agency 
relationship may dampen ORPs.  As discussed infra, our findings are consistent in some ways, and differ in some 
respects.  Arlen, et al., however, seek to measure ORPs between agency and principal; our study examines the effect 
of an agency-principal relationship on the agent’s ORPs vis-à-vis third parties.  For other studies concerning 
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believe our study to be the first to examine the effect of an agency relationship on the agent’s 
ORPs vis-à-vis others.     
Our findings are dramatic.  Our study indicates a significant decrease in a concern for 
fairness when a participant in a market transaction acts as an agent for another and owes a duty 
to maximize the return to the principal.  We find no such decrease when the agent is acting 
without the explicit duty to maximize return to the principal. These findings were made in the 
context of a modified “ultimatum game,” a classic one round, non-cooperative “fairness” 
experiment which isolates out both the impact of reputation and learning from repeat playing.16   
We believe it is important to examine carefully any norm for agents that may increase unfairness 
to third parties.  While recognizing the risks of extrapolating from our experiments to actual 
practice, one could suggest that our findings indicate that existing corporate law may indeed 
provide incentives to director/agents to act unfairly toward non-shareholder stakeholders when 
the directors attempt to serve the interests of the shareholders.17 
 This paper proceeds thusly.  Part II describes ultimatum games, how they have been used 
to date in exploring the strength of fairness norms in market exchanges, and how ultimatum 
games have been used to date in legal scholarship.  Part III provides a more in-depth description 
of the theoretical justification for the experiments we conducted.  Part IV describes the 
                                                                                                                                                             
behavior within principal/agent contexts, see, e.g., Werner Güth, Wolfgang Klose, Manfred Konigstein and Joachim 
Schwalbach, An Experimental Study of a Dynamic Principal – Agent Relationship, 19 MANAGE. DECIS. ECON. 327 
(1998) (examining principal’s trust and agent’s reciprocity in principal-agent relationship); Ernest Fehr, Simon 
Gachter and George Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 
ECONOMETRICA 833 (1997) (examining reciprocity in similar context). 
 
16 One theoretical reason to examine the impact of behavioral norms in the Ultimatum Game is provided in the work 
of Ken Binmore, a scholar skeptical of claims that the game establishes continued fairness over time.  KEN 
BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, VOLUME 2: JUST PLAYING (1998) at 29-37. Binmore 
nevertheless believes that the fairness observed in players  is consistent with what he calls a “homo sociologicus” 
model in which the laboratory experiment “triggers a fairness norm in the heads of the participating subjects, who 
then simply ‘play fair.’” Id. at 36-37. 
 
17 Moreover, these cognitive biases may exacerbate certain existing but unfortunate aspects of fiduciary duty.  An 
extreme example is the traditional view that lawyers, as fiduciaries for clients in an adversarial legal system, must 
behave unfairly.  A famous practitioner, Charles P. Curtis, explained that he had an ethical duty to breach an oral 
contract, not legally binding because of the statute of frauds, in order to accept a better offer for his client.  Curtis 
observed that he heartily agreed that he was behaving like “a son of a bitch to do it.”  Charles P. Curtis, “The 
Advocate” from IT’S YOUR LAW (1954) excerpted in JOHN NOONAN AND RICHARD PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER (1996) at 52. Recent findings in cognitive psychology are showing 
just how pernicious such a review of fiduciary duty may be. 
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experiments as we conducted them, and Part V sets out the findings.  Part VI concludes by 
sketching out some of the potential implications for the dramatic findings of our study. 
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 II. Ultimatum Games in Legal Scholarship 
A. Basics of the Ultimatum Game 
The ultimatum game is an experiment that is typically played with two parties.18  The 
experimenter gives the first person, the proposer, a pot of real or fictional money.  The proposer 
must propose an allocation of the money between herself and the other party, the responder.  The 
proposer can keep all the money for herself, give the responder a little, or give the responder a 
lot.  In response, the responder can only make one move.  She can either accept or reject the deal.  
If the responder accepts the deal each party will receive the amount the proposer allocates to her.  
If the responder rejects the deal, neither party will receive anything.  Typically, neither party 
knows the identity of her counterpart, and the parties play the game against each other only once, 
so reputational effects and the possibility of retaliation are eliminated as factors. 
According to traditional economic theory, there is only one rational outcome for the 
game.  Whatever the proposer offers, as long as it is greater than nothing, it is rational for the 
responder to accept the deal.  The economically rational offer for the proposer to make is the 
smallest unit of currency available because it is expected that the responder will accept any offer 
greater than zero.  But “[t]his turns out to be a very bad prediction about how the game is 
actually played.”19  The numbers vary, but it is quite common for responders to reject offers of 
less than twenty percent of the total amount available.  In fact, the average minimum amount that 
responders say they would accept is between 20% and 30% of the total sum.20  In other words, 
                                                 
18 The scholarship on ultimatum games is extensive.  The Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler article cited above is probably 
among the most accessible introductions for the legal scholar.  Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach.  Also, there are 
numerous articles with more rigorous descriptions and analyses from an economic perspective.  See, e.g., Gary E. 
Bolton, Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 95 (1995); Rachel 
T.A. Croson, Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study, 30 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 197 (1996); 
David Dickinson, Ultimatum Decision-Making: A Test of Reciprocal Kindness, 48 THEORY & DECISION 151 (2000); 
Glenn W. Harrison & Kevin A. McCabe, Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining  Experiment, 25 INT’L 
J. GAME THEORY 303 (1996); Vesna Prasnikar & Alvin E. Roth, Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: 
Experimental Data from Sequential Games, Q.J. ECON. 865 (Aug. 1992); Ramzi Suleiman, Expectations and 
Fairness in a Modified Ultimatum Game, 17 J. ECON. PSYCH. 531 (1996). 
 
19 Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, at 1490. 
 
20 Id.  Fehr and Gachter summarize the major studies saying that “proposals that give the Responder less than 30 
percent of the available sum are rejected with a very high probability.”  FEHR & GACHTER, at 5. 
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responders would sometimes prefer no deal rather than an unfair one, even if the unfair deal 
would make them better off financially.21 
Interestingly, proposers tend to offer somewhere between 40% and 50% of the pot to the 
responders.22  This effect could be based on a belief that the responder is not a rational economic 
actor, so the amount the proposer offered reflects a judgment about what the responder’s 
reservation price is likely to be.  On the other hand, the proposer’s offer might be based on an 
altruistic motive.  The proposer may suggest an allocation based not on a rational judgment about 
what the proposer would likely accept, but on the basis of what would be a fair amount to 
allocate to the responder.  The latter explanation gains credence form data showing that 
participants’ behavior is affected by their relationships with the other parties in the game.  If the 
participants know and care about the other players of the game, their bargaining behavior is more 
likely to be “fair” than economically “rational.”23 
Note the presence of “good” behavior as well as “bad” or spiteful behavior.  The proposer 
offers more than she needs to offer, but the responder rejects deals that would benefit both 
parties if the offer is too unfair.  The issue, of course, is what is “fair.”  In the context of 
ultimatum games, “[p]eople judge outcomes to be ‘unfair’ if they depart substantially from the 
terms of a ‘reference transaction’ – a transaction that defines the benchmark for the parties’ 
interactions.”24  If parties are dividing an amount of money that neither party is more entitled to 
than the other, such as when the experimenter in the game provided the money, the reference 
                                                 
21 Fehr and Gachter report that this kind of “negative” reciprocity “is observed in a wide variety of cultures, and high 
monetary stakes do not change or have only a minor impact on these experimental results.”  Id. 
 
22 Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, at 1490. 
 
23 See Jason F. Shogren, Fairness in Bargaining Requires a Context, 31 ECON. LETTERS 319, 322 (1989) (“A 
bargainer will be fair to the group with whom his loyalties lie.”); Richard Thaler, The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 195, 205 (1988) (noting that more generous offers in ultimatum game were made between bargainers within 
same group, while least generous offers were made across groups); cf. Roy Radner & Andrew Schutter, The Sealed-
Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study, 48 J. ECON. THEORY 179, 209-10 (1989) (describing non-ultimatum game 
bargaining experiment and noting success of face-to-face bargaining in achieving transactions, but noting high 
variance in prices formed, suggesting that “while the face-to-face mechanism may exhibit high efficiency levels, it 
may be lacking in terms of equity”). 
 
24 Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, at 1496 (citing Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729-30 (1986)). 
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transaction is typically an even split among the parties, or close to it.25  If there is some reason 
both parties consider one party to be more entitled to the money, then the reference transaction 
favors the person the parties see as having a greater entitlement. 
B. Applications of the Ultimatum Game in Legal Scholarship 
 Legal scholars have employed ultimatum game bargaining experiment results to examine 
the role that ORPs such as fairness can play in a large number of different legal settings.  These 
results have been used as evidence of the importance fairness considerations in legal fields such 
as contracts,26 negotiations,27 property,28 product liability,29 corporate bankruptcy,30 and corporate 
governance.31   Ultimatum game bargaining experiments have been widely discussed in the 
expanding law and behavioral economics literature.32  
Because the results of the Ultimatum Game so clearly indicate systematic consideration 
of fairness at variance with any conventional definition of rational utility maximization, the game 
has stimulated much interesting scholarship.  Tom Ulen has written about how the research 
findings of BLE, including the ultimatum game, will require a re-thinking of rational choice 
theory.33  For example, a workhorse of law and economics is the Coase Theorem, which provides 
                                                 
25 Id. 
 
26 Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 433 (1997). 
 
27 See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HVN L. R. 1 
(1999); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. 
L. REV. 435 (2000); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L. J. 1789 (2000). 
 
28 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited; Critical 
Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX L. REV. 219(2001). 
 
29 See Jon. D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 
74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 630 (1999). 
 
30 See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2001). 
 
31 See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as 
Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002).  For a more detailed description of the possible implications of 
ultimatum game experiments on corporate law scholarship, see infra text at notes __.   Other corporate law scholars 
have used behavioral insights to analyze a range of corporate governance issues.  [add cites:  Cunningham, 
Langevoort, Stout, Arlen, etc]  
 
32 See. e.g., Ulen, supra n. __.  
 
33 Id. at 458-59. 
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that when transaction costs are low, the market enables parties to bargain to divide a cooperative 
surplus without the need for legal supplementation.  As Ulen has written “the results of the 
ultimatum bargaining game experiments point out that there may be circumstances in which a 
bargain will not occur even though, on Coasian grounds . . . we should expect a bargain to take 
place.  Therefore, we may wish to be less sanguine about the scope of unregulated behavior and 
more aggressive about legal intervention in order to prevent over-reaching in bargaining 
situations.”34  Ulen suggests that this problem with the applicability of the Coase Theorem may 
also require a “rethinking” of the view that contract law is a “set of off-the-shelf default rules.”35   
 Ulen has also suggested that the weakness of the Coase Theorem may have important 
implications for property law and bargaining.36  “[T]he Calabrese and Melamed suggestion for 
choosing between property and liability rules solely on the basis of transaction costs may need to 
be amended in light of the results of the ultimatum bargaining game experiments.”37  On the 
other hand, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir has used the results of ultimatum game bargaining 
experiments to suggest that the original conclusion of Calabrese and Melamed that property rules 
(equitable relief) should be preferred over liability rules (compensatory money damages) 
whenever transaction costs are low is indeed correct.38 
 Lewisohn-Zamir questions the accuracy of recent suggestions of scholars such as Ayers 
and Talley, and Kaplow and Shavel that liability rules are preferable because property rules 
enable entitlement owners to behave greedily to capture all gains.  She argues instead that the 
results of ultimatum game bargaining experiments underscore the existence of fairness 
preferences.  Moreover, she compares bargaining in the shadow of potentially coercive liability 
                                                 
34 Id. at 459. 
 
35 Cite. 
 
36 Id. at _____.   
 
37 Ulen, supra note __, at 459.  
 
38 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited:Critical 
Observations from Behavior Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219 (2001).  
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rules to the Dictator Game which consistently generates results that are systematically less fair 
than those of the Ultimatum Game.39 
 Owen Jones has discussed the Ultimatum Game in particular, and the experimental 
results of BLE in general, in the context of suggesting a theoretical model for the entire field 
based upon evolutionary biology.40   Jones explains while the Ultimatum Game does not generate 
a consistent maximum return, seemingly inefficient preferences for fairness and spite may have a 
rational basis in behavioral biology.  Even if these preferences no longer seem “rational,” they 
may have been evolutionarily favored because fairness helped to foster necessary cooperation, 
and “it is adaptive to identify cheaters, and to be identified as a non-sucker – someone not easily 
exploited.  Consequently, the predisposition to act spitefully when being unfairly exploited by a 
stingy cooperator may be a time-shifted rationality, underpinning seemingly irrational behavior 
in modern contexts.41   
In a thoughtful critique of BLE, Kyron Huigens provides a philosophically informed 
discussion of the Ultimatum Game.42   Huigens suggests that the importance of fairness must be 
viewed deontologically within virtue ethics and not as part of a consequentialist economic 
analysis.43  The experiments indicate the existence and power of fairness as a value, but Huigens 
argues that BLE’s attempt to reduce concerns about this value to a preference for other’s welfare 
that can be treated like any other utility function is doomed to failure.  “Fairness recognizes 
irreducible, context-dependent and incommensurable values.”44   Recognition of humane values 
beyond the humane values of the marketplace remains important, but economics is not equipped 
to address them.45 
                                                 
 
39 Id.  In the Dictator Game the responder has no power to reject the allocation and must accept whatever is 
proposed.  The results from this game are much less egalitarian than in the Ultimatum Game.  Id. at 240.  
 
40 Jones, supra n. __, at __. 
  
41 Id. at 1183. 
 
42 Kyron Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 537 (2001). 
 
43 Id. at 560.  
 
44 Id. at 561 
 
45 Id. at 568.  For another deontological discussion of the Ultimatum Game see Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in 
the Law of Non-Disclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 337, 374 (1997) (arguing that the deserved advantage principle is 
established by Ultimatum Game results and should be regarded as deontological). 
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 Our projects seeks to add to this important scholarship by using a modified ultimatum 
game to analyze the strength of fairness norms in a context of an agent’s behavior when acting 
alternatively with and without a duty to maximize the return to the principal. As set out below, 
our findings thus far indicate that the agency relationship alone does not materially affect 
behavior, but that a wealth maximization norm, added to the agency relation, has a robust impact 
by reducing behavior responding to fairness norms.46  The next Part explores more in depth the 
theoretical underpinning of our project within corporate law and scholarship.  
 
III. Theoretical Justification for Study 
A. The Potential Implications of Behavioral Economics on Corporate Law  
The contributions of BLE to scholarship are already significant, mostly in bringing into 
question the canonical assumption, which drives many areas of the law, that individuals 
maximize utility.  The potential impact of BLE is particularly striking in corporate law, 
traditionally an intellectual bastion of economic conventionalism.47  The dominant contemporary 
view of corporate law is contractarian, meaning that corporate constituencies are assumed to be 
best able to determine their mutual rights and obligations by way of voluntary arrangement.48  
Law should not dictate the details of the obligations among the parties because each party is 
assumed to know her own interests and to protect them best through bargaining and exchange.   
This view of corporate law, then, depends fundamentally on the notion that the 
participants in the corporate contract are economically rational actors.  If they do not know their 
best interests, or do not act so as to maximize their utility, the arrangement will differ, perhaps 
substantially, from what would be efficient.  In certain circumstances, such divergence from 
efficiency is an important and serious public policy problem.  Accordingly, one important 
potential contribution of BLE to corporate law is to help predict in what contexts individuals’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
46 The norm of shareholder wealth maximization is widely accepted, but as Jeffrey Gordon has recently suggested, 
there is not, as yet, any empirical evidence that shareholder wealth maximization is beneficial to corporations (cite). 
 
47 See Arlen, et al., supra n. 7, at 1.  See also Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using 
Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 799 (1998) 
(arguing that corporate law is the “closest living relative” of classic utilitarianism). 
48 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991). 
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behavior diverge from what is conventionally termed an efficient outcome and to suggest ways 
for law to correct for such biases in some way.  
Perhaps the most important area of potential BLE contribution to corporate law is within 
the debate about the role of corporations in society, and whether corporate governance should 
include consideration of interests other than those of shareholders.  If a corporation’s 
stakeholders prefer to make decisions on the basis of values other than utility maximization, the 
normative justifications for an efficiency-focused corporate law become more difficult to make. 
Moreover, BLE could help weaken the contractarian arguments against legal and 
regulatory intervention to protect various stakeholders in the firm.  Under contractarian theory, 
because everyone is assumed to be able and willing to protect their own interests, the role of 
government is understandably minimized.  And, more profoundly, when government seeks to 
help participants in the corporate enterprise, contractarian analysis supposes that such efforts are 
in fact harmful to the intended beneficiaries of the government protection.  Whichever party to 
the contract has superior bargaining power will simply force other parties to the contract to pay 
for whatever regulatory benefit bestowed upon them. 
Insights from BLE could provide some answers to these anti-regulation contractarian 
arguments.  First, it might be the case that people do not know their interests well at all, and 
government regulation could help protect those interests nevertheless or help individuals learn 
what their own interests are.49  Second, if there is some “stickiness” in bargaining terms because 
of endowment effects or some other cognitive bias toward the status quo, government 
intervention on behalf of one party to the corporate contract might indeed provide real benefits to 
that party because it will be difficult for other elements of the contract to be adjusted to 
compensate.50  Third, if BLE indicates that people (even people within corporations) concern 
themselves with principles other than, or in addition to, efficiency, then government regulation in 
furtherance of those other principles or to encourage behavior based on those other principles 
might not cause a renegotiation of unrelated terms in the corporate contract. 
                                                 
49 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 326-30 (1997) (discussing value of information as 
tool to help people learn what their interests in fact are). 
50 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (status 
quo bias prevents contracting parties from bargaining around default rules, even when doing so is in their best 
interests);  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 
101 YALE L. J. 729, 746-59 (1991) (discussing legal implications of high costs of contracting around default rules). 
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BLE analysis of corporate law also adds to the normative arguments in favor of a 
stakeholder view of corporate governance.  One of us has used results from various behavioral 
experiments to argue that by changing corporate governance in the United States, one can 
efficiently attain “certain preferred policy outcomes, such as an increase in the wages of working 
people and a decrease in income inequality.”51  Basic to this argument that a change in corporate 
governance would be beneficial is that, at present, legal structures and the norms they embody – 
such as the duty to maximize shareholder return – constrain corporate directors from behaving in 
ways that they themselves would consider fair or just.52  They are required by law and practice to 
concern themselves with fairness only vis-à-vis the shareholders, and to discount or disregard 
their concerns for fair treatment of any constituency other than shareholders.  If, however, 
directors were less constrained by shareholder primacy, they would be able to take into account 
the concerns of stakeholders other than shareholders.  They would tend to act with more fairness 
toward other constituencies, and such fairness would be revealed in salary and wage decisions 
and perhaps in any number of additional ways.53  In this view, corporate directors are likened to 
proposers in a complex ultimatum game in which their main goal is to allocate the resources in 
such a way that no stakeholder withdraws from the game.  The claim is that, freed from the duty 
to maximize shareholder return,  directors would act similarly to typical proposers in ultimatum 
games and consider fairness as one of the touchstones of their decision making.   
Some states have indeed weakened the shareholder primacy norm by adopting 
“stakeholder statutes” that permit corporate directors to take into account the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies when making important corporate decisions.54 Many corporate 
scholars believe that a weakening of the obligation to maximize profit, whether through 
stakeholder statutes or some other change in corporate governance, would not inure to the benefit 
                                                 
 
51 Greenfield, supra, note 33, at at ____. 
 
52 See Greenfield & Nilsson, supra; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: 
An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995). 
53 The presence of a stakeholder statute would not remove completely the influence of  the shareholder primacy 
norm, because of the still-extant legal and commercial infrastructure that support the norm even for companies 
governed by stakeholder statutes.  Thus one might expect some greater ability on the part of directors to act on the 
basis of fairness norms, but fairness norms would of course not be the directors’ only basis for action. 
 
54 [Cites.]  One state, Connecticut, requires directors to take non-shareholder interests into account in certain 
circumstances.  [Cite.] 
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of non-shareholder stakeholders.55  The management, these scholars argue, would simply use 
their greater discretion to benefit themselves. 
 Other scholars (including one of us) argue that stakeholder statutes – or other methods of  
weakening the profit-maximization norm – could provide measurable benefits to workers and 
other non-shareholder stakeholders.56  One mechanism by which this would occur would be for 
the directors’ beliefs about fairness to influence them to distribute more of the corporate surplus 
to workers or other contributors to the corporate enterprise.  Such a distribution would normally 
produce specific, preferred public policy outcomes, such as a decrease in income inequality and 
an increase in hourly wages.57  This assertion is supported by a recent study by Marianne 
Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, who studied the impact of state anti-takeover legislation on 
wages.58  They reasoned that anti-takeover legislation passed in many states during the 1980s 
decreased the threat of takeovers and thus expanded managerial discretion.  Using firm-level 
data, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that these laws increased wages 1% to 2%, or about $500 
per year.59 This study thus bolsters the proposition that managers, if given more legal discretion 
to allocate the firm’s surplus without fear of legal challenge, would allocate more of it to labor. 
The potential implications of BLE for corporate law and scholarship are thus significant.  
BLE may not only bring into question the fundamental premises of economic rationality that 
underlie the contemporary view of corporate law but may also provide a foundation for positive 
arguments in favor of what might replace conventional corporate law theory.  
B. Purpose and Nature of Current Project 
We believe that ultimatum game experiments offer one method to test the possible 
efficacy of changes in corporate governance, by testing whether people act differently in market 
transactions when they are constrained by an agency relationship and by an obligation to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
55 [Cites.] 
 
56 See Greenfield, supra. 
57 Greenfield, supra n. 33, at 636. 
 
58 Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting?  A Test Using Takeover 
Legislation, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 535 (1999). 
 
59 Id. at 535. 
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maximize the return from the game to the principal.60  As described in Part II, ultimatum game 
experiments are discussed routinely in psychological, behavioral economics, and legal 
scholarship.  They seek to learn whether people act only in ways that maximize their economic 
well-being or whether other principles influence their behavior.  If they act differently when they 
are acting on their own behalf than when they are acting under constraints that are analogous to 
constraints imposed by corporate law, then such findings might have implications for corporate 
governance scholarship. 
We modified the traditional form of the ultimatum game for use in a classroom 
setting and then conducted two sets of experiments.  The experiments were designed to 
test: (1) whether individuals’ concerns for fairness are dampened when they act as agents 
for a third party; and (2) whether individuals’ concerns for fairness are dampened when 
the agency relation is supplemented with an obligation to maximize the return to the third 
party.  These tests are relevant to the issues in the corporate governance scholarship with 
regard to whether corporate directors should be considered agents of shareholders, and 
whether corporate directors should be held to a duty to maximize shareholder profit. To 
our knowledge, ultimatum tests have not yet been used specifically to test the traditional 
assumptions underlying corporate law theory and doctrine in the United States.  Thus, we 
believe our experiments to be the first that use some version of the ultimatum game to 
test different modes of corporate governance. 
 
                                                 
60 The proposition that a fiduciary duty to one party weakens the ability to be fair to other parties has not been 
widely tested in experimental settings.  One relevant test was conducted a number of years ago by Helmut Lamm.  
See Helmut Lamm, Group Related Influences on Negotiation Behavior: Two-Person Negotiation as a Function of 
Representation and Election, in BARGAINING BEHAVIOR 284 (Heinz Sauermann, ed., 1978).   Lamm conducted 
experiments testing how negotiation behavior would be affected when both negotiators acted for others as 
representatives rather than acting only for themselves.  Lamm reported that “elected representatives, as compared to 
non-representatives, negotiated with greater toughness but less success: negotiations were broken off more 
frequently, less profit was obtained, and (own) satisfaction was lower.  Thus, social role demands, while presumably 
creating pressure for superior outcomes, had the ‘ironic’ effect of inferior outcomes.”  Id. at 284.  Our results are 
consistent in significant ways with Lamm’s results.  We also find that agents, acting under a duty to maximize the 
return to their principals, showed less willingness to share a pot of money with third parties.  In an ultimatum game 
context, this resulted in fewer “deals” being successful.  See infra. 
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IV. Design of Experiments61   
A. Basic Design Elements  
Two sets of ultimatum games were conducted, both among first-year law students in 
constitutional law classes taught by colleagues at Boston College Law School.  Neither of the 
authors had visited or participated in the class before the day of the experiment.  The 
experiments were conducted immediately following their regularly-scheduled class, and the 
students’ participation was totally voluntary.  In both classes, approximately a third of the 
students in the course stayed to participate.62  In the first set of experiments, conducted on April 
26, 2002, a total of 38 students participated.  In the second set of experiments, conducted on May 
7, 2002, a total 34 students participated.63  A total of 72 students participated in the experiments.  
All students were at the end of their first year of law school at Boston College.  All of the 
students in each class were in the same first-year section and thus had shared most of the same 
courses over the year.  The familiarity among the students was thus high. 
Because the reliability of results is considered greater when real money is at stake, we 
devised a method by which students would act as though real money was at stake even though 
we did not have the funds to have every student play with real money.64  In both sets of 
experiments, a significant portion of the students were randomly selected after the completion of 
the experiment to have their “deals” consummated using real money.  In the first experiment, a 
total of 10 pairs of students, over half of the students who participated, were selected to have one 
of their bargains consummated. Of these 10 pairs, 7 pairs had reached a “deal,” and $350 was 
allocated.  In the second experiment, a total of 12 pairs of students, or 71% of the students in the 
experiment, had their bargains consummated.  Of these 12 pairs, seven had reached a “deal,” and 
                                                 
61 We are extremely interested in the feedback of readers with regard to the design of these experiments.  We 
conducted these experiments with funds received as part of a small grant from Boston College.  We hope to receive 
more funding from other sources in the near future, which will give us further opportunities to expand and adjust our 
experiments. 
62 Because participation was voluntary, and because not everyone who participated were assured of receiving 
money, the self-selection of the group may have skewed the experiment toward more “altruistic” results. 
63 The authors also conducted several pilots of these experiments.  Money was used in only one of these pilots.  The 
results of the pilots, however, are largely consistent with the results of the experiments described in the text. 
64 We are grateful to Tom Tyler for his assistance in this part of the experimental design. 
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again $350 was allocated.  The ex ante likelihood that the bargains would be consummated was 
quite high in both experiments, which means that it is likely that the students in the experiment 
indicated their real preferences during the experiments. 
We also faced issues of confidentiality.  We believed that the results would be more 
reliable if the test subjects were not concerned about reputation effects.  We dealt with this 
concern in several ways.  First, each students was given a unique identification number, and the 
students were told that their answers would be identified only by their number in any report of 
results.  We told them that there would be no way for the authors to link them to their answers.  
We also informed students that their answers would remain confidential from any other person 
involved in the experiment, including the student with whom they were paired in the ultimatum 
game.  
There were two ways, however, that the confidentiality of results might be considered 
compromised.  In both experiments, the students were informed with whom they were paired at 
some point during the experiment.  This was necessary because one of the things we wanted to 
test was whether there would be a difference between the offering and reservation prices under 
alternating conditions of anonymity and knowledge.  In order to inform each student whom they 
were paired with, we asked each pair of students, identified by their numbers only, to raise their 
hands so that they could see with whom they were paired.  Because we were in the room during 
this process, the students might have been concerned that we could have taken note of which 
student was which.  We made a point of not doing so, but a student concerned about 
confidentiality might nevertheless have felt her anonymity was compromised by this design.  
The second way the anonymity was compromised occurred in the first experiment only.   
In order to allocate the cash payments at the completion of the entire experiment, ten pairs of 
students were randomly selected by having students choose index cards each marked with an 
identification number.  In the second iteration of the first experiment, as described below, the 
proposers were acting as agents for another student in the room, who was identified only on an 
index card within a sealed envelope held by each proposer.  For the pairs chosen to have their 
deal consummated for the second turn, the agents were instructed to open their envelopes and 
read the identification number of the student for whom they were acting.  The students whose 
cards were picked left the room, in pairs, along with the author conducting the experiment and, 
for the second turn, the student for whom the proposer was acting.  The answers were then 
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revealed and the money allocated.  Thus in these cases, the answers were revealed, after the 
experiment, to the author and to the other student(s) involved.   
This breach in confidentiality was solved in the second experiment.  After randomly 
determining the students whose deals would be consummated and announcing the identification 
numbers, the authors asked all the students to leave the room. The authors then read the answers 
of the still-anonymous students, allocated the money (if the deals were successful), and put the 
money in envelopes marked with the identification numbers only.  The students were instructed 
that they could re-enter the room and claim their envelopes after the authors had left.  
B. The First Experiment 
In the first experiment, on April 26, the ultimatum game was conducted twice.  Professor 
Greenfield conducted this experiment alone.  After reading consent forms and listening to a 
description of the experiment, the students were randomly divided into two groups.  The groups 
were asked to sit on opposite ends of the classroom, so as to minimize communication between 
subjects in the two groups.  The students were also instructed not to discuss their answers with 
anyone, even those in their own group, during the course of the experiment.  One group was told 
that they would be proposers, and one group was told they would be responders.  The students 
were informed that the experiment would be performed two times, and that five pairs of students 
from each turn – a total of twenty students – would have their bargain consummated.  Each 
student filled out a simple demographic sheet, stating their sex, age, and year in law school (all 
were 1Ls in these experiments).  Each student received an identification number, to ensure that 
their answers could not be identified with them afterwards.  The proposers received identification 
numbers P101 through P119, and the responders received identification numbers R101 through 
R119.  The record sheets for the first experiment appear below as Appendix A. 
1. The first iteration (the “paired” condition). 
In the first iteration of the game, the students were told that they would be 
engaging in an ultimatum game with a student in the other group.  The students were then 
informed of the student with whom they were paired.  This was done by asking P101 and 
R101 to raise their hands.  This was continued for all nineteen pairs. 
The proposers were then asked to imagine that they each were given $50.  The 
proposers were asked to write on a simple form how much of that amount they proposed 
to keep and how much they proposed to offer to the responder.  The responders were 
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instructed to write on their answer sheets the lowest amount they would accept, their 
“reservation amount.”  The students were also informed that if the proposer offered the 
responder an amount equal to or greater than the responder’s reservation amount, the 
transaction would be deemed to have been completed, and both parties would receive the 
amount proposed by the proposer.  The students were also informed that if the 
responder’s reservation amount was greater than the amount the proposer offered to the 
responder, the transaction would be deemed to have not been completed, and neither 
party would receive anything.65 
2. The second iteration (the “agency” condition) 
In the second iteration of the first experiment, an agency relationship was created 
on the part of the proposers.  Each proposer was asked to write her identification number 
on an index card and seal them in envelopes.  The envelopes were then gathered, 
shuffled, and redistributed among the proposers.  The proposers were told: 
 
“In this turn the basic rules for the experiment will remain the same with one 
exception.  Instead of acting on their own behalf, the proposers will be acting on 
behalf of someone else.  The responders will continue to act on their own behalf. 
 
“Each proposer will find an envelope in your packet with a blank index card 
inside. Please write on the paper your “subject ID.”  Once you have done this, 
place the paper back into the envelope and seal it.  
 
[The envelopes were then redistributed to other proposers.] 
 
“Please do not open the envelope.  Write your proposer number on the outside. 
 
“In this turn, the proposers are not acting on their own behalf but on behalf of the 
person who is identified by the paper within their envelope.  
 
“Please imagine that I am now giving each of the proposers $50.  Each proposer 
will propose an allocation of that $50 between the party for whom he or she is 
acting and the responder with whom he or she is paired.” 
 
“Remember that if the responder rejects the proposed allocation the deal will fail 
and neither party will receive anything.” 
 
                                                 
65 Examples of the answer sheets used in the two experiments appear in the appendix. 
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Note that the instructions created an agency relationship in that each proposer was not 
acting on her own behalf but on behalf of one of the other proposers, who would remain 
anonymous.  The instructions, however, did not inform the proposers what rule of behavior, if 
any, they should apply in acting on behalf of the person who was identified in their envelope. 
C. The Second Experiment 
In the second experiment, on May 7, the ultimatum game was conducted three times.  
Both authors were present.  As in the first experiment, the students read and signed consent 
forms, listened to a description of the experiment, and then were randomly divided into two 
groups.  The groups were asked to sit on opposite sides of the classroom, so as to minimize 
communication between subjects in the two groups.  The students were also instructed not to 
discuss their answers with anyone, even those in their own group, during the course of the 
experiment.  One group was told that they would be proposers, and one group was told they 
would be responders.  The students were informed that the experiment would be performed three 
times, and that four pairs of students from each turn – a total of twenty-four students – would 
have their bargain consummated.   As in the first experiment, each student filled out a simple 
demographic sheet, stating their sex, age, and year in law school (all were 1Ls in these 
experiments).  Each student received an identification number, to ensure that their answers could 
not be identified with them afterwards.  The proposers received identification numbers P101 
through P117, and the responders received identification numbers R101 through R117.  The 
form record sheets for the second experiment appear below as Appendix B. 
1. The first iteration (the “anonymous paired” condition). 
In the first iteration of the game, the students were told that they would be 
engaging in a game with a student in the other group, but that they would not know 
specifically with whom they were paired.  The ultimatum game was then conducted as in 
the first experiment, using $50 as the transaction amount.  The students were also 
reminded that four pairs of them would have their bargains actually completed for this 
round.  
2. The second iteration (the “paired” condition) 
In the second iteration of the experiment, the students were then informed of the student 
with whom they were paired.  This was done by asking P101 and R101 to raise their hands.  This 
was continued for all nineteen pairs.  This iteration thus mirrored the conditions of the first 
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iteration of the first experiment.  Thus, in this iteration both players in each pair knew with 
whom they were playing, and both of them were acting on their own behalf. 
3. The third iteration (the “agency/fiduciary duty” condition)66 
In the third iteration of the first experiment, we created an agency relationship on 
the part of the proposers.  Each proposer was asked to write her identification number on 
an index card and seal them in envelopes provided.  The envelopes were then gathered, 
shuffled, and redistributed.  The proposers were then told: 
 
“In this turn, the proposers are not acting on their own behalf but on 
behalf of the person who is identified by the paper within their envelope.  The 
rules of the experiment for this turn are that the proposers should consider 
themselves bound by an obligation to attempt to maximize the return that the third 
party will receive from the transaction.  Use your judgment to get the biggest 
actual return for the party for whom you are working.  There is no way for us to 
enforce this requirement.  In fact, because of the confidential nature of your 
answers, we will not know who you are.  But it is important that all of you really 
do your best to maximize the return for the person identified in your envelope.”  
 
“Please imagine that I am now giving each of the proposers $50.  Each 
proposer will propose an allocation of that $50 between the party for whom he or 
she is acting and the responder with whom he or she is paired.”  
 
“Remember that if the responder rejects the proposed allocation the deal 
will fail and neither party will receive anything.”  
 
Note that the instructions created an agency relationship, in that each proposer was not 
acting on her own behalf but on behalf of one of the other proposers, who would remain 
anonymous.  The difference between this iteration and the second iteration from the first 
experiment was that here. the proposers were given a rule of behavior, a norm, to apply in acting 
on behalf of the person who was identified in their envelope. 
 
                                                 
66 Here and throughout, we use the term “fidcuiary duty” to describe the requirement to maximize the return to the 
party for whom the player was acting.  We recognize that this term is somewhat a term of art, and may or may not 
include a duty to maximize in a given legal context.  Because of the potential confusion, we did not use this term in 
describing the game to the players.  We use it now for convenience. 
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 V. Preliminary Findings 
Because the number of students in each experiment was small, and because of possible 
imperfections in the research design relating to confidentiality, our results should be considered 
preliminary only.  Nevertheless, the results are striking and indicate further study is worthwhile.  
The results from both experiments appear as spreadsheets in Appendices C. 
 A. First Experiment  (April 26) 
The results for the two iterations of the first experiment are summarized in Tables 
1 and 2.  In the first iteration (the “paired” condition), the proposers offered allocations 
from a “pot” of $50 that ranged from $10 to $30, with a mean of $22.05.  Responders had 
reservation amounts ranging from $1 to $30, with a mean reservation amount of $17.58.  
Eleven of the 19 deals (58%) were successful, meaning that the proposed allocation from 
the proposer was greater than or equal to the responder’s reservation amount.. 
In the second iteration, (the “agency” condition), the proposers offered allocations 
that ranged from $5 to $35, with a mean offer of  $22.84.  Responders had reservation 
amounts that ranged from $0 to $35, with a mean reservation amount of $17.05.  Again, 
11 of the 19 deals (58%) were successful.  
The results from the two iterations are summarized in the following chart.  The 
mean proposal amounts in the first and second iterations of the experiment are extremely 
close, and a oneway analysis of variance confirms that they are not significantly 
different.67  F(1,18) = 0.261 p= .616.   There are also no discernable gender or age effects. 
                                                 
67 A oneway analysis of variance compares two possibilities about the provenance of the data: the first is that all the 
data has come from the same normal distribution. A single mean and variance for this distribution is fit to the data 
on this assumption. The second is that the factor - here with values “First” and “Second” - describes different normal 
distributions. Then two means and a shared variance are fit to the data on this assumption. The data will make one of 
these assumptions more likely (in the statistical sense that one of them makes the observed data more probable than 
the other). A comparison is done by computing a ratio of the likelihoods under each assumption. The test statistic F 
is the ratio and it is larger the more likely the multiple distribution assumption seems in the light of the data. Here, 
F=0.261, lower than 1 (a balanced ratio). The numbers 1 and 18 reflect how many data points went into the test 
statistic, and the p value indicates that it is unlikely that the multiple distribution assumption is true for these data.  
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Table 1: Mean Proposal Amounts in First Experiment  Under Two Conditions68 
Condition Mean SD SE 
First (paired) 22.0526 4.8244 1.1068 
Second (agency) 22.8421 5.8335 1.3383 
   
Similar results hold for the reservation amounts. The table below describes the mean 
reserve amount by condition. The means are not significantly different.  F(1,18) = 0.179 
p=0.677. Moreover, Gender does not appear to have any effect on reservation amount.  
F(3,15)=0.60  p=.98. 
 
Table 2: Mean Reservation Amounts in First Experiment  Under Two Conditions   
Condition Mean SD SE 
First (paired) 17.5789 10.5847 2.4283 
Second (agency) 17.0526 11.4962 2.6374 
 
Interestingly, the age of the proposer just misses significance in both iterations. Our 
assistant fit a regression model to see whether there is any significant linear relation between the 
reservation amount and the proposer and responder's ages. The fitted coefficients are shown 
below. 
 
Table 3: Effects of Age on Reservation Amount   
  Estimate SE69 Stand. Sig.  
Co. -25.3405 28.2399 -0.8973 0.1889  
PA1 1.7961 1.2076 1.4873 0.0745  
RA1 0.0004 0.7600 0.0005 0.4998  
PA2 1.9598 1.2076 1.6229 0.0583 ?
RA2 -0.1695 0.7600 -0.2231 0.4126  
   
“Co.” represents a baseline amount, and PA1 represents a measurement of the effect of a 
one-year increase in the proposer’s age on the reservation price in turn one, while RA1 
represents the a measurement of the effect of a one-year increase in the responder’s age on the 
reservation amount in turn one.  PA2 and RA2 represent the same measurement in turn two.  The 
age of the proposer come close to statistical significance at the 0.05 (*) level in both turns.  The 
                                                 
68 “Condition” refers to the conditions in each iteration; “Mean” is the mean value of the proposed allocations under 
each condition; “SD” is standard deviation; “SE” is the standard error, a margin of error for the mean estimate. 
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estimates suggest that adding a year to the age of the proposer in both conditions adds about 
$1.80 and $1.95 to the reservation amount respectively.  In other words, there is some indication 
that a responder dealing with an older proposer will require a greater percentage of the allocation 
than one dealing with a younger proposer. 
Other than the possible age effects, what is striking about the results from this 
experiment is that there was so little change between the two turns.  The mean amount 
the proposers chose to allocate to the responders did not meaningfully change (an 
increase of $0.79), and only nine of the 19 subjects changed their answer at all between 
turns one and two.  Six of those nine increased the amount they were willing to allocate 
to the responders, and three decreased.  The responders also had little change in their 
responses from turn one to turn two.  The mean fell by 53 cents, and only eight of 
nineteen changed their reservation amounts.  Four of that eight increased their reservation 
amount and four decreased. 
 It is worth exploring further why these values did not change between turns one and two, 
despite the creation of the agency relation.  The striking nature of the lack of change between the 
two turns is accented further when compared to the significant results in the second experiment 
below. 
 B. Second Experiment (May 7)  
The second experiment contained three iterations: one with the “anonymous 
paired” condition, the second with the “paired” condition, and the last with the 
“agency/fiduciary duty” condition.  The results are summarized in Tables 4 and 6 below. 
In the first iteration, in which the players were not aware with whom they were 
paired, proposers produced offers ranging from $10 to $26, with a mean offer of $19.76.  
Responders claimed reservation amounts ranging from $1 to $25, with a mean of $15.82.  
Twelve of 17 deals (71%) were successful.  In the second iteration, when both players 
knew with whom they were paired, proposers’ mean offer went up to $21.47, an increase 
of $1.71.  The proposers offered allocations ranging from $10 to $35.  Responders’ 
claimed reservation amounts ranging from $1 to $25, with the mean reservation amount 
                                                                                                                                                             
69Again, “SE” indicates a margin of error.  99% confidence intervals, or “error bars,” for parameter estimates can be 
approximated by +/- twice the SE. 
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fell $1.24 to $14.59.  Fourteen of 17 deals (82%) were successful.70  Finally, in the third 
iteration, in which proposers were acting on behalf of another and were asked to seek to 
maximize return to that other person, the change in proposed allocations was dramatic. 
Proposers’ mean offer fell to $16.94, a decrease of over $4.50.  (The proposed offers 
ranged from $10 to $30.)  The change in responders’ reservation amounts was much less 
dramatic, falling to $14.00.  Only 9 of 17 deals (53%) were successful. 
 The May experiment generated a number of effects worth considering carefully.  These 
effects include the result that the rules of the third iteration affected the proposal amount 
significantly, and that gender and age may have affected the results in significant ways. 
1. Effects of Conditions on Proposal Amounts 
 The proposal amounts are summarized in the table below. 
Table 4: Mean Proposal Amounts in Second Experiment Under Three Conditions71 
Condition Mean SD SE 
First (anonymous/ 
paired) 
19.7647 5.5060 1.3354 
Second (paired, no 
agency) 
21.4706 6.2761 1.5222 
Third (agency/fid 
duty) 
16.9412 5.4253 1.3158 
 
When the means are compared across conditions, a oneway analysis of variance shows they are 
significantly different.  F(2,32)=4.457 p<.05.  The table above shows that the third condition is 
lower than the first and second.  
As noted above, a oneway analysis of variance compares two possibilities about the 
provenance of the data: the first is that all the data has come from the same normal distribution. 
A single mean and variance for this distribution is fit to the data on this assumption. The second 
is that the factor – here with values “First,” “Second” and “Third” – describes different normal 
distributions (there may be more than three). Then three means and a shared variance are fit to 
the data on this assumption. The data will make one of these assumptions more likely (in the 
                                                 
70 Note that the conditions of this second iteration were the same as the first turn in the first experiment.  The results 
were quite similar for the proposers but not for the responders: in the first experiment the proposed amount was 
$22.05; in the second experiment it was $21.47.  The responders’ reservation amount in the first experiment was 
$17.58; in the second it was $14.59. 
 
71 Again, “Mean” is the mean value of the amount, “SD” its standard deviation, and “SE” the standard error. 
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statistical sense that one of them makes the observed data more probable than the other). A 
comparison is done by computing a ratio of the likelihoods under each assumption. The test 
statistic F is the ratio and it is larger the more likely the multiple distribution assumption seems 
in the light of the data. Here F=4.457, which is several times larger than 1 (a balanced ratio). The 
numbers 2 and 32 reflect how many data points went into the test statistic, and the p value 
indicates that it is very unlikely that the single distribution assumption is true for this data.  
To get more of a sense of the size of the condition effects, our assistant performed a 
regression of the proposal amounts on dummy variables representing the three conditions. The 
second condition proposal amount was treated as a baseline.72  The table below shows the 
estimated model coefficients, their margin of error, their standardized values, and the level of 
statistical significance they attain in this regression.73 
 
Table 5: Effects of Conditions on Proposal Amounts in Second Experiment 
  Estimate SE Stand. Sig.   
Co. 21.4706 1.3942 15.3995 0.000 *** 
C1 -1.7059 1.9718 -0.8652 0.1956   
C3 -4.5294 1.9718 -2.2971 0.0130 * 
   
The constant term Co. represents a baseline amount, the mean amount proposed in the 
second condition.   C1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the first condition 
(anonymous pairs) and 0 otherwise. C3 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the third 
condition and 0 otherwise.  In this model, we interpret C1 as the amount by which the proposal 
amount increases/decreases from the Co. baseline when subjects are in the first condition, and C3 
as the amount it increases/decreases from the baseline amount when subjects are in the third 
(fiducial) condition.  As the table indicates, the mean proposal amount would be expected to 
decrease $1.71 when the players are anonymous, as compared to when they know with whom 
they are paired.  The mean proposal amount would be expected to decrease (as compared to the 
                                                 
72 Analysis of variance is a special case of regression analysis that does not allow continuous explanatory variables.  
General regression analysis is conventionally presented in a way that is, for our purposes, more easily interpretable, 
since it deals explicitly with parameters, i.e., effect sizes, rather than abstract tests of hypotheses. 
 
73 Showing the standardized coefficient - `Stand.' is `Estimate' divided by `SE' - is conventional (so other people can 
choose a different level of significance and still make use of  the results) but it will not aid interpretation and may be 
ignored when reading these tables. The important quantities in the table for present purposes are the estimate itself 
and its level of statistical significance, denoted by one or more asterisks. 
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situation in which they know with whom they are paired and are acting on their own behalf) by 
$4.53 when the proposers are acting as agents with a duty to maximize the return to those agents. 
The statistical interpretation of the model is as follows: The coefficient Co. is 
significantly different from 0 at the .001 level, C1 is not significantly different from 0, and C3 is 
significantly greater than 0 at the 0.05 level.  Reliability is quantified by the level of significance, 
conventionally <0.05 (*), <0.01 (**), or <0.001 (***). The smaller the number, the less likely 
this coefficient estimate is to have been generated by chance rather than the systematic factors 
manipulated in the experiment.  
 This means that we can be confident, statistically speaking, that the true baseline amount 
offered by proposers is greater then 0, and that the true amount by which the proposed offers in 
the third condition decline from the baseline amount is also greater than 0. Non-significance 
indicates that a coefficient is not estimated reliably and that its direction and magnitude may not 
be sufficiently stable if we estimate it over repeated versions of the same experiment. 
The substantive interpretation of the model is that the experimental data allow us to infer 
that the third, fiducial condition in the experiment generates lower proposal amounts.  We can 
also infer that the expected value of the amount proposed in the third condition is approximately 
$4.53 (or 9% of the pot) less than in the second condition.  In other words, this experiment 
indicates that proposers acting on behalf of a principal, instructed to maximize the return to that 
principal, were much less generous in allocating a portion of the pot to responders.74 
                                                 
74 And as noted above, many fewer deals were consummated.  In the third condition, only 53% of the deals were 
successful, as compared to 82% when proposers and responders knew with whom they were paired and the 
proposers were not limited by the fiduciary relation. 
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2. Effects of Conditions on Reservation Amounts 
 Having established that the experimental conditions generate different proposal amounts 
we considered the reservation amounts in the same way.  The conditions produced results that 
were very close (see Table 6) and, predictably, not significantly different.  F(2,32)=2.111 
p=0.138.  
 
Table 6: Mean Reservation Amounts in Second Experiment  Under Three Conditions 
Condition Mean SD SE 
First (anonymous/ 
paired) 
15.8235 8.9529 2.1714 
Second  (paired, no 
agency) 
14.5882 9.5594 2.3185 
Third (agency/fid 
duty) 
14.0000 8.6241 2.0917 
 
Although the reservation amounts seem to show a trend downward over the three 
conditions, this effect is quite weak and not statistically significant. Formally, the differences are 
not large enough for us to be able to reject a null hypothesis that the reservation prices are 
actually just the same over all conditions. 
3. Age Effects 
We also investigated the effect of covariates, beginning with the age. The model we used 
estimates the effect the age of the proposer and the age of the responder has on the proposal 
amount in each of the three conditions. A separate set of age coefficients was fitted for each 
condition in case age has a different effect depending on the game being played. The dummy 
coefficients described earlier representing which game is being played are also included as 
controls.  The coefficients are the proposer’s age (“PAge”) and the responder's age (“RAge”) in 
each of the three conditions. 
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Table 7: Effects of Age on Proposal Amounts Under Three Conditions   
  Estimate SE Standard. Sig.   
Co. -61.6775 25.0999 -2.4573 0.0091 ** 
PAge1 2.6712 1.0724 2.4908 0.0083 ** 
RAge1 0.2677 0.5217 0.5131 0.3052   
PAge2 1.8637 1.0724 1.7379 0.0447 * 
RAge2 1.6632 0.5217 3.1882 0.0013 * 
PAge3 0.7436 1.0724 0.6934 0.2459   
RAge3 -0.2639 0.5217 -0.5058 0.3078   
C1 12.6851 35.4967 0.3574 0.3613   
C3 67.5403 35.4967 1.9027 0.0319 * 
   
In this model the age of the proposer is significantly related to the proposal amount in the 
first and second conditions, but not in the third.  Increasing the age of the proposer by 1 year 
leads to a $2.67 and $1.86 increase in the proposal amount over the first two iterations 
respectively.  The older the proposer, the more likely she was to allocate a greater percentage of 
the pot to the responder.  The model also suggests a corresponding effect of the age of the 
responder in the second condition.  That is, the proposer appears to be affected by the age of the 
responder, at least in the second iteration.  (Naturally there is no reliable effect of responder age 
in first condition since he or she is unknown to the proposer). In the second iteration, increasing 
the age of the responder by one year appears to add about $1.66 to the proposal they receive.75  
 The effect of age appears to be decreasing over the games –  the absolute value of the 
coefficients decreases as the pairs perform in each condition. If this effect is reliable, it may be 
driven either by the condition itself, i.e. the game being played, or by the subjects’ experience 
with each other over the course of the whole experiment. With more theory available a more 
constrained model could be fit to a subset or combination of these age factors, and more precise 
estimates would be possible.  
 Fitting the same model to the reservation amount data we find the following. 
 
                                                 
75 Also worth noting is that there is still a significant effect of the third condition, as in the previous model, even 
with age factors controlled for.  
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Table 8:  Effects of Age on Reservation Amounts Under Three Conditions  
  Estimate SE Standard. Sig.  
Co. -51.9168 44.9163 -1.1559 0.1271  
PAge1 3.3123 1.9191 1.7260 0.0459 *
RAge1 0.0524 0.9335 0.0561 0.4778  
PAge2 3.1334 1.9191 1.6328 0.0550 ?
RAge2 -0.2800 0.9335 -0.2999 0.3829  
PAge3 3.8525 1.9191 2.0075 0.0256 *
RAge3 -0.2985 0.9335 -0.3198 0.3754  
C1 -10.8577 63.5213 -0.1709 0.4325  
C3 -16.9381 63.5213 -0.2667 0.3955  
   
Consistent with the hints from the results of the first experiment, here there appear to be 
fairly reliable relationships between the proposer’s age and the reservation amount. In the first 
and third conditions the increase in reservation amount for a one year increase in the proposer’s 
age is $3.31 and $3.85 respectively. The second condition appears to indicate a similar increase 
of approximately $3.13, though it narrowly misses significance at the conventional 0.05 (*) 
level. These effects are much more similar across conditions than the corresponding age effects 
on the proposal amount in the previous model. 
 Notably, there does not appear to be any relation between the age of the responder and 
the reservation amount.  Why would the proposer’s age have such a dramatic effect on the 
responder’s reservation amount?  Some hypotheses might be developed.  Perhaps responders 
expect older proposers wo be more aware of fairness norms and are more willing to “punish” 
such proposers if they do not abide by such norms.  Or, perhaps responders themselves feel more 
altrustic toward younger proposers and thus maintain lower reservation amounts.  Nevertheless, 
this effect is worth further attention, in order to hypothesize why a proposer’s age would have 
such an impact on the responder’s reservation amount. 
 We are skeptical of these results, however.  The results indicate a correlation between the 
proposer’s age and the reservation amount even in the first iteration of the experiment, when the 
players did not know with whom they were paired.  There is no reason for responders to be 
affected by the age of proposers they did not know with whom they were dealing.  The 
dubiousness of the apparent effect under the first condition erodes our confidence in the apparent 
effects from the second and third iterations. Nevertheless, since the results in the second and 
third conditions are as strong as they are, and because these results parallel the suggestive results 
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from the April 26 experiment (see Table 3),  we remain intrigued.  We are curious to see whether 
these results reappear in future experiments. 
4. Gender Effects 
 We also looked at whether there was any effect of gender on the proposal amounts, and 
no statistically significant difference was found.  There were several suggestive patterns, 
however, that deserve further inquiry.  Same sex pairs seem to have higher proposal amounts, 
and male and female proposers appear to differ in their response to the third experimental 
condition. 
We were curious as to whether proposers would be more generous if they were matched 
with someone of the same gender.  Using a model that considers same-gender and non-same 
gender pairs as the two gender variables, the table below describes the mean proposal amounts 
for each value of this variable.  
 
Table 9: Effects of Same-Sex Pairing on Proposal Amounts   
  Mean SD SE 
Diff-gen 17.7083 6.7275 1.3732 
Same-gen 20.8889 4.7824 0.9204 
   
In this representation of the data, proposers offer a larger amount when paired with someone of 
their own gender.  These differences are not significant, however.  F(1,15)=2.354 p=.145.  The 
effect nevertheless appears worthy of additional study, as it appears to indicate that same-sex 
pairings result in a proposal amount of more than $3 (6%) greater than when the players are of 
different sexes.76 
 We also looked at a possible proposer-gender-specific effect in the third condition. This 
model is the same as the previous one except that the same-gender / different-gender variable is 
replaced with one that notes only the proposer’s gender in each pair. The following table 
describes the mean proposal amounts for all combination of conditions.  
 
                                                 
76 Also, because these data conflate the results over the three conditions, the effect might be muted. 
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Table 10: Effects of Proposer’s Gender on Proposal Amount   
P-gender Condition Mean SD SE 
M First 20.2000 6.3403 2.8355 
M Second 21.0000 3.9370 1.7607 
M Third 21.2000 5.4498 2.4372 
F First 19.5833 5.4181 1.5641 
F Second 21.6667 7.1774 2.0719 
F Third 15.1667 4.5092 1.3017 
   
The effect of proposer gender is not significant F(1,15)=0.698 p=.417, but the effect of 
gender on the third condition is again very suggestive.  From the descriptive statistics there 
appears to be more than a $6 (12%) difference in proposal amount in the third condition ($21.20 
to $15.17) depending on the gender of the proposer.  Female proposers’ allocations dip by this $6 
in the third condition.   This effect, if genuine, might be explained by any number of theories.  
The effect might suggest that male proposers’ dedication to proposing a fair allocation is more 
robust than that of female proposers.   Or, the effect might be explained by female proposers 
being more attentive to the rules of the game or by male proposers being more willing to replace 
the rules of the game with their own judgment. 
 Quite interesting is that even though the variation in reservation amounts across 
conditions was small (see above), and the sex of the responder does not appear to be significant, 
the sex of the proposer had a large effect on the amount the responder was willing to accept in 
each of the iterations.  The table below represents the gender information in terms of the gender 
of the proposer only. The table shows mean reservation amounts for pairs with female proposers 
and pairs with male proposers. Responders paired with male proposers appear to generate much 
smaller reservation amounts ($8.67 compared with $17.36).  
 
Table 11: Mean Reservation Amounts by Proposer Gender   
Prop-G Mean SD SE 
Female 17.3611 7.2787 1.2131 
Male 8.6667 9.6708 2.4970 
   
This is partly confirmed by putting the new gender representation into an analysis of 
variance like the one above. Now the effect just misses significance F(1,15)=4.124 p=.06.  
Although the effect of the gender of the proposer on the reserve amount narrowly misses 
significance, the model suggests that male proposers induce reservation amounts in their 
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responders that are on average about $8.70 smaller (almost 17% of the pot) than those induced 
by female proposers. This effect seems stable across conditions.77   
This effect deserves further attention as well.  If substantiated, one would be challenged 
to present a theory as to why the gender of the proposer would have such an effect on 
responders’ reservation amounts.  One might theorize that responders – of both genders – are 
more willing to “punish” female proposers for failing to offer a fair allocation, and that a high 
reservation price effects this punishment.  Responders might also believe that male proposers – 
counter-factually, as it turns out, if the data above are substantiated – will be less generous than 
their female counterparts.  If responders believe male proposers will be more stingy, their 
expectation might show up as a willingness to accept a lower amount in an exchange with a male 
proposer. 
5. Age and Gender Together 
Finally, we put the gender and age analyses together in an overarching model.  Using the 
game condition, the proposer's age, the responder's age, and the proposer's gender, we sought to 
analyze variation in the proposal and reservation amounts.78  First we treat the proposal amount.  
Table 12 describes the coefficient estimates for a regression model.  
 
Table 12: Effects of Age and Gender on Proposal Amount   
  Estimate SE Stand. Sig.   
Co. -61.6217 24.3014 -2.5357 0.0077 * 
PG1 0.4479 2.5070 0.1787 0.4296   
PA1 2.6657 1.0387 2.5664 0.0071 * 
RA1 0.2689 0.5051 0.5324 0.2987   
PG2 -0.7361 2.5070 -0.2936 0.3853   
PA2 1.8727 1.0387 1.8029 0.0396 * 
RA2 1.6612 0.5051 3.2888 0.0011 ** 
PG3 5.9803 2.5070 2.3854 0.0110 * 
PA3 0.6710 1.0387 0.6460 0.2610   
RA3 -0.2476 0.5051 -0.4901 0.3134   
C1 12.5955 34.3673 0.3665 0.3580   
C3 67.0316 34.3673 1.9504 0.0292 * 
   
                                                 
77 Again, because these results conflate the data over the three conditions, including the first condition in which the 
pairs did not know with whom they were paired,  the significance of the results may be muted. 
 
78 We did not look at responder gender for this model, as it appeared to not have a significant effect. 
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Here PG is the variable for the gender of the proposer (0 for female, 1 for male).  PA is 
the variable representing a one-year increase in the proposer's age, and RA is the analogous 
variable for responder's age.  The number following each letter combination indicates the 
condition they are estimated in.  (E.g., “PG1”  is the effect of the proposer’s male gender on the 
offered allocation in the first iteration.  “RA3” is the effect of a one-year increase in the 
responder’s age in the third iteration.)   
When all the variables are put together, the clearest effect is that of the gender of the 
proposer in the third condition (“PG3”).  Male proposers have larger proposal amounts because 
female proposers drop their offer by almost $6.00 (12% of the pot) in this condition.   This effect 
easily reaches statistical significance at the 0.05 (*) level, and barely misses the 0.01 (**) 
significance threshold.  As mentioned above, this effect is might be explained by a number of 
theories.  It deserves further study. 
 As in Table 7, the proposer’s age also appears to create significant results in the first two 
iterations of the game.  Older proposers tend to allocate more of the pot to the responder, at least 
when the proposers are acting on their own behalf.  One explanatory theory, among others, is 
that older proposers are more attune to fairness norms.  The agency and maximization 
requirements of the third iteration, however, appear to be strong enough to quash this effect. 
 Also, similar to the data described in Table 7, the responder’s age in the second condition 
(“RA2”) appears to create significant effects.  There would naturally be no effect of responder’s 
age in the first iteration, as the players did not know with whom they were paired.  But in the 
second iteration, when both players knew with whom they were paired and before the proposers 
were constrained by the requirements of the third condition, the proposal amount increased $1.66 
(over 3%) for every one-year increase in a responder’s age.  This effect is the most robust of the 
lot, nearly reaching the 0.001 (***) threshold.  Theories should be developed to explain this 
effect as well.  One might be that proposers believe that older responders will be more attuned to 
fairness norms.  (This would be similar to the way that older proposers are, at least under the 
theory put forward above, more attuned to fairness norms.)  If so, proposers would be more 
willing to offer a higher allocation to older responders in order to ensure that their deal is 
consummated.  
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 The same variables applied to the reservation amount yields the following set of 
regression coefficients. 
 
Table 13:   Effects of Age and Gender on Reservation Amount  
  Estimate SE Stand. Sig.  
Co. -51.2357 39.9138 -1.2837 0.1034  
PG1 -9.6110 4.1177 -2.3341 0.0124 *
PA1 3.4288 1.7060 2.0098 0.0257 *
RA1 0.0262 0.8296 0.0316 0.4875  
PG2 -8.9930 4.1177 -2.1840 0.0175 *
PA2 3.2425 1.7060 1.9006 0.0324 *
RA2 -0.3044 0.8296 -0.3670 0.3578  
PG3 -8.2075 4.1177 -1.9932 0.0266 *
PA3 3.9520 1.7060 2.3165 0.0129 *
RA3 -0.3209 0.8296 -0.3868 0.3505  
C1 -10.8109 56.4467 -0.1915 0.3825  
C3 -16.9976 56.4467 -0.3011 0.4246  
   
The model suggests that male proposers cause responders to generate a reservation 
amount that is $9.61 (almost 20%) less than with female proposers in the first condition.  This 
effect repeats in the second and third conditions, with the magnitude of effect being $8.99 (18%) 
and $8.21 (16%), respectively.   These estimates should be interpreted lightly, since the number 
of observations that are generating them is very small.  Also, these results are questionable 
because there is no reason why the proposer’s gender should affect the reservation amount in the 
first condition, since the pairings were anonymous and thus the responder did not know the 
gender of the proposer. 
The proposer’s age also appears to affect the reservation amount, roughly equally across 
conditions.  An extra year on the proposer leads to approximately $3.50 more on the reservation 
price.   But again, these results are questionable since they appear not only in the second and 
third conditions but in the first as well, when the players did not know with whom they were 
paired.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Much work remains to be done in analyzing the results of these experiments, developing 
theories for the results, and attempting to test and replicate the results in additional experiments.  
That having been said, we believe our experiments are quite suggestive in several ways. 
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 Potentially the most important finding is the effect of the third condition in the second 
experiment.  By creating an agency relation linked to a duty to maximize return to the principal, 
this third condition created a situation that could be analogized to the situation of corporate 
directors, who owe a duty to maximize return to shareholders. Because the experiment shows 
that the proposers offer an allocation that is less generous to responders than in the first and 
second iterations, it supports the notion that the fiduciary duty of corporate directors lessen the 
generosity of directors when negotiating with non-shareholder stakeholders of the firm, such as 
workers. This finding in turn supports the adoption of “stakeholder statutes” in order to empower 
corporate directors to act on the basis of fairness norms in making decisions on behalf of the 
firm.  
 Compared to the marked effects of the third condition in the second experiment, the 
absence of significant effects in the first experiment bears attention.  In the first experiment, the 
agency relationship was not augmented with a stated duty to maximize the return to the principal, 
and there was no significant difference between the results from turn one, when the proposers 
were acting on their own behalf, and turn two, when they were acting on behalf of another.  If 
these effects are genuine, one could interpret them aggressively to suggest that legal rules affect 
fairness norms more than agency relationships do.  This insight would have doctrinal 
implications for corporate law by suggesting that the legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth 
may affect director behavior more than their putative agency relationship toward shareholders. 
Also striking is the apparent effect of proposers’ gender  in the third condition of the 
second experiment.  Our experiment indicates that the behavior of female proposers was affected 
more by the requirements of the third condition than were males.  While male proposers seemed 
to largely ignore the instructions of the third condition, offering a statistically equal amount in 
the third turn, female proposers offered more than $6 less to the responders.  This effect, if 
genuine, might be explained by any number of theories.  The effect might suggest that male 
proposers’ dedication to proposing a fair allocation is more robust than that of female proposers.   
Or, the effect might be explained by female proposers being more attentive to the rules of the 
game or by male proposers being more willing to replace the rules of the game with their own 
judgment.  In any event, this effect is worth considerable attention in future work. 
 Finally, our experiments suggest that the ages of both the proposer and responder affect 
the proposal amounts.  In general, older proposers offer a higher allocation to the responders 
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(except in the third condition), and proposers offer a higher allocation to older responders in the 
second condition.  In other words, older proposers appear to be affected by fairness norms more 
than younger proposers, and proposers appear to be more willing to share a greater percentage of 
the pot with older responders than with younger ones.  The requirements of the maximization 
norm in the third condition appear to quash both effects, however. 
Overall, then, our experiments show a number of effects that deserve further serious 
study.  
